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Recently Quantum Battle of The Sexes Game has been studied by Luca Marinatto and Tullio
Weber. Yet some important problems exist in their scheme. Here we propose a new scheme to
quantize Battle of The Sexes Game, and this scheme will truly remove the dilemma that exists in
the classical form of the game.
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2Introduction
Quantum game and quantum strategies is a new born field. Although many novel features have been discovered
by researchers in the previous works[1, 2, 3, 4, 5], some problems also exist. In a recent article of Luca Marinatto and
Tullio Weber[6], they proposed a scheme to quantize the famous Battle of The Sexes Game. In the usual exposition of
this game, Alice and Bob are trying to decide where to go on Saturday night. Alice wants to attend the Opera, while
Bob prefers to watch TV. And both players would be happier to spend the evening together rather than apart. Both
players want to maximize their individual payoff. Table (1) indicates the payoffs of Alice and Bob. The first entry
in the parenthesis refers to Alice’s payoff, and the second to Bob’s. To satisfy the preferences of the two players, the
condition α > β > γ is imposed.
Bob: O Bob: T
Alice: O (α, β) (γ, γ)
Alice: T (γ, γ) (β, α)
(1)
There are two Nash equilibrium (O,O) and (T, T ) existing in the classical form of the game. Since there is no transfer
of information between two players, they face the dilemma in choosing between two stable solutions. If the mismatch
situation occurs, that is if one player chooses strategy O and the other chooses strategy T , then the payoff to both
players is γ and it is the worst situation.
Luca Marinatto and Tullio Weber[6] give an Hilbert structure to the strategic spaces of the players, so allowing
the existence of linear combinations of classical strategies to be interpreted according to usual formalism of orthodox
quantum mechanics. They applied this formalism to the study of the Battle of the Sexes Game. The result is that if
both players are allowed to play entangled quantum strategies, the game has a unique solution.
This article attracts the attention of S.C. Benjamin and he made a comment[7] on it. In his comment two obser-
vations were made:“ Firstly, the overall quantization scheme is fundamentally very similar to the scheme proposed
by Eisert et al.[2]-the similarity is non-obvious because of the very different use of the word ‘strategy’ in the two
approaches. Secondly, we argue that the quantum Battle of the Sexes Game does not in fact have a unique solution,
hence the players are still subject to a dilemma.” In the work of Luca Marinatto and Tullio Weber[6], the initial
strategy is set to 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), and ‘tactics’ of the players are limited to a probabilistic choice between applying
the identity I and C = σx. So Benjamin pointed out “this is a severe restriction on the full range of quantum
mechanically possible manipulation”. In the scheme of Luca Marinatto and Tullio Weber[6], p∗ and q∗ are used to
represent the probability of Alice’s and Bob’s choosing σx respectively. The authors get two profile tactics which
satisfy the maximum expected payoff of the players. One is (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) and the other is (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1). Since
the final entangled quantum ‘strategy’ remains unchanged in either case, so this is the unique solution in the game.
However, Benjamin wrote that “it seems to us that a clear dilemma remains for the players”. Because there are two
pairs of tactics (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) and (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1), without knowing the choice of the other player, the players face
the dilemma to choose between them, Benjamin continue, “If the tactics are mismatched, i.e. if either (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 1)
or (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) are adopted, then the worst situation will occur. This is almost the same problem faced by the
players in the traditional game.”
In replying these remarks, Luca Marinatto & Tullio Weber outlined some topical points of their work which they
hold to be crucial for a better comprehension of their new approach to the quantum theory of games[8]. Regarding
terminology, they think “the choice of calling ‘strategies’ the quantum states instead of the ‘operators’ used to
manipulate them, is very natural and quite consistent with the spirit of the classical game theory”. As far as the
choice of the tactics set is concerned, they wrote that “obviously the class of allowed manipulations could be enlarged,
but in our paper we did not take care of this possibility since our minimal choice was enough to reproduce intact
the classical results when considering only factorizable strategies and to obtain the disappearance of the dilemma
when resorting to entangled strategies”. As regards the possibility of the occurrence of the mismatch situation, they
consider it from the perspective of practical operation. They think that “since both the choices will eventually lead
to the same final strategy”, “it is therefore apparent that both players, knowing this fact, will decide doing nothing
on their strategy”. They have two reasons for their decision. One is that “doing nothing could be considered cheaper
than doing something”. The other is “Which player will in fact decide to refuse a certain gain, without prospects of
a better gain and running the risk of incurring a loss?”.
The reply of Luca Marinatto and Tullio Weber sounds reasonable from the perspective of their paper. Yet we
consider the terminology ‘strategy’ as the operation of a player on his state. The process of obtaining initial state is
not included in the strategic space. According to the concept of the static game, the strategic moves of the players
are local operations, and each player has no information about the strategies of other player. Since the process
of obtaining initial state 1√
2
(|OO〉 + |TT 〉) from |OO〉 must be a global operation and every player clearly knows
it, so this process could not be called as strategy. Furthermore we think that in the scheme of Luca Marinatto &
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FIG. 1: The setup of Battle of Sexes Game.
Tullio Weber the probability p∗ and q∗, which are used to represent the probability of Alice’s and Bob’s choosing σx
respectively, are classical probabilities. Since σx and I are equivalent to classical pure strategies “flip” and “not-flip”
respectively, the operation of the player could be considered as the classical mixture of classical strategies.
In this paper, we propose a new scheme in which there is no restriction on the quantum mechanically possible
manipulations of the players, and the strategy space is the complete set of SU (2). Here the terminology ‘strategy’ is
consistent with the one used by Eisert et al.[2]. And the operation of a player is the probabilistic mixture of the pure
quantum strategies. We show that if both players resort to mixed quantum strategy, although there are still many
profiles of Nash equilibria, the possible tactic mismatch will have no influence on the players. So the dilemma which
exists in the traditional Battle of the Sexes Game is removed.
I. THE QUANTIZATION OF BATTLE OF THE SEXES GAME
Our physical model for quantizing the game is similar to the delicate scheme introduced by Eisert et al.[2, 9]. Figure
1 indicates the flow of information in the Battle of the Sexes Game.It is composed of a source of two bits, one bit for
each player. |O〉 =
(
1
0
)
represents the state of going to Opera and |T 〉 =
(
0
1
)
represents the state of watching
TV. The state of the game is described by a vector in the tensor product space which is spanned by the basis |OO〉,
|OT 〉, |TO〉 and |TT 〉, where the first entry refers to Alice’ state and the second to Bob’. Gate J is a unitary operator
and consist of a Hadamard gate and a C-NOT gate. So the prepared state after gate J is
|ψi〉 = J |OO〉 =
1√
2
(|OO〉 + |TT 〉) (2)
So the density matrix of the initial state is
ρi = |ψi〉 〈ψi| (3)
The strategies of Alice and Bob are denoted by unitary operator UA and UB. Alice and Bob independently operate
on her/his qubit with UA and UB respectively. UA and UB are chosen from the strategy space S. Considering the
possible strategies of the players, the strategy space S should be all of SU(2), and the general expression of the unitary
operator is
U (θ, φ, ψ) =
(
ei(φ+ψ)/2 cos θ2 ie
i(φ−ψ)/2 sin θ2
ie−i(φ−ψ)/2 sin θ2 e
−i(φ+ψ)/2 cos θ2
)
(4)
with −pi 6 θ 6 pi,−pi 6 φ 6 pi,−pi 6 ψ 6 pi. We set f as the probability of the operator U which will be chosen
by the players. Naturally f is a probability density function with respect to U . It is obvious that f(U) > 0 and∫
SU(2)
f (U) dU = 1. Here we use the invariance of the Haar measure, assumed to be normalized so that the volume
4of SU (2) is 1. The probabilities of Alice choosing UA and Bob choosing UB are denoted by fA(UA) and fB(UB)
respectively. So after the strategy moves of Alice and Bob, the final density matrix
ρf =
∫
A
∫
B
fAfB (UA ⊗ UB) ρi (UA ⊗ UB)+ dUAdUB (5)
The payoff operators for Alice and Bob are{
$ˆA = α |OO〉 〈OO|+ β |TT 〉 〈TT |+ γ (|OT 〉 〈OT |+ |TO〉 〈TO|)
$ˆB = β |OO〉 〈OO| + α |TT 〉 〈TT |+ γ (|OT 〉 〈OT |+ |TO〉 〈TO|)
(6)
The expected payoffs of Alice and Bob are mean values of these operators and hence are functional of fA and fB.
$¯A (fA, fB) = Tr
(
ρf $ˆA
)
=
∫
A
∫
B
fAfB
[
Tr
(
(UA ⊗ UB) ρi (UA ⊗ UB)+ $ˆA
)]
dUAdUB
=
∫
A
∫
B
fAfB$A (UA, UB) dUAdUB (7)
$¯B (fA, fB) = Tr
(
ρf $ˆB
)
=
∫
A
∫
B
fAfB
[
Tr
(
(UA ⊗ UB) ρi (UA ⊗ UB)+ $ˆB
)]
dUAdUB
=
∫
A
∫
B
fAfB$B (UA, UB) dUAdUB (8)
Where $A (UA, UB) and $B (UA, UB) are the payoff functions of Alice and Bob when they adopt the pure quantum
strategies UA and UB respectively, the expression of $A and $B are as follows:
$A = αPOO + βPTT + γ (POT + PTO) = (α− γ)POO + (β − γ)PTT + γ (9)
$B = αPOO + βPTT + γ (POT + PTO) = (β − γ)POO + (α− γ)PTT + γ (10)
Since Alice and Bob adopt the pure quantum strategies, here Pστ = |〈στ | (UA ⊗ UB) |ψi〉|2 is the joint probability of
the final state collapses into the basis |στ〉.
POO = PTT =
1
4
(1 + cos θA cos θB − cos (ψA + ψB) sin θA sin θB) (11)
From the expression of POO and PTT , we have
$A (UA, UB) = $B (UA, UB)
=
α+ β − 2γ
4
(1 + cos θA cos θB − cos (ψA + ψB) sin θA sin θB) + γ
=
α+ β + 2γ
4
+
α+ β − 2γ
4
(cos θA cos θB − cos (ψA + ψB) sin θA sin θB) (12)
Substitute equation(12) into equations(7,8), we can obtain expressions of $¯A and $¯B as funtionals of f
∗
A and f
∗
B.
Now we investigate Nash Equilibrium in this game. The definition of Nash Equilibrium {s∗A, s∗B} for pure strategy
in two-player games can be expressed as the following inequalities{
$A (s
∗
A, s
∗
B) > $A (sA, s
∗
B)
$B (s
∗
A, s
∗
B) > $B (s
∗
A, sB)
∀sA, sB ∈ SU (2) (13)
When extended to the mixed strategies (fA and fB), the Nash Equilibrium profile {f∗A, f∗B} can be expressed as follows{
$¯A (f
∗
A, f
∗
B) > $¯A (fA, f
∗
B)
$¯B (f
∗
A, f
∗
B) > $¯B (f
∗
A, fB)
∀fA > 0, ∀fB > 0,
∫
A
fAdUA =
∫
B
fBdUB = 1. (14)
5It is obvious that f∗A > 0, f
∗
B > 0,
∫
A f
∗
AdUA =
∫
B f
∗
BdUB = 1. By using calculus of variations to the equation(14), we
obtain the following equations: 

(
δ$¯A(fA,f
∗
B
)
δfA
)
fA=f∗A
= λA(
δ$¯B(f
∗
A
,fB)
δfB
)
fB=f∗B
= λB
(15)
where λA and λB are constant. From equation(7,8), the left hand of the equation(15) can be rewritten as follows

(
δ$¯A(fA,f
∗
B
)
δfA
)
fA=f∗A
=
∫
B
f∗B (UB) $A (UA, UB) dUB(
δ$¯B(f
∗
A
,fB)
δfB
)
fB=f∗B
=
∫
A
f∗A (UA) $B (UA, UB) dUA
(16)
From above calculation, we get the following equation.

λA =
δ$¯A(fA,f
∗
B
)
δfA
=
∫
B
f∗B (UB) $A (UA, UB) dUB
λB =
δ$¯B(f
∗
A
,fB)
δfB
=
∫
A
f∗A (UA) $B (UA, UB) dUA
(17)
Here, the left hand of equation λA (or λB) is a constant independent of UA and UB, but the right hand of equation(17)
generally depends on UA (or UB). The equation has o solution without the guarantee of f
∗
B (UB) (or f
∗
A (UA)) that
there is no UA(UB) in the result of the integral of $A (UA, UB) (or $B (UA, UB)). On the other hand, any f
∗
A (UA) and
f∗B (UB) which meet the guarantee of f
∗
B (UB) (or f
∗
A (UA)) will be solution of equation(17), and the profile {f∗A, f∗B}
will be one of the Nash Equilibria of the game. When Alice’s mixed strategy is f∗A and Bob’s is f
∗
B, neither of them
can increase her/his payoff by unilaterally changing her/his own strategy.
The solutions of equation (17) are obviously infinite, that means there is no unique stable strategies. However, the
possible tactic mismatch will have no influence on the players because for any f∗A which satisfies equation(17) will
yield
$¯A (f
∗
A, f
∗
B) =
∫
A
∫
B
f∗Af
∗
B$A (UA, UB) dUAdUB
=
∫
A
f∗A

∫
B
f∗B$A (UA, UB) dUB

 dUA
= λA
∫
A
f∗AdUA (18)
= λA (19)
So the payoff for Alice ($¯A (f
∗
A, f
∗
B)) is not related to her own strategy (f
∗
A) but her opponent’s strategy(f
∗
B). Similarly
the payoff for Bob ($¯B (f
∗
A, f
∗
B)) is λB , which is not related to his own strategy (f
∗
B). It is apparent that for any
combination of f∗A and f
∗
B which belongs to the stable strategies (solutions of equation(17)), the payoffs for alice is
λA and for Bob is λB. Further more, through the following caculation we find that the payoffs of Alice and Bob is
the same (λA = λB). So the players will not worry about the occurrence of tactic mismatch. Then the dilemma in
the classical Battle of The Sexes Game is removed.
From the expression of θ, φ, ψ in equation(4), the normalized invariance of the Haar measure is
dU (θ, φ, ψ) =
1
16pi2
|sin θ| dθdφdψ (20)
So the integration on the right hand of the equation(17) can be rewritten as integration with respect to θ, φ, ψ.
For any f∗A which satisfies the equation(17), we get
∫
A
f∗A (UA) $B (UA, UB) dUA being independent of UB, hence∫
A
f∗A (UA)Pστ (UA, UB) dUA is independent of UB. From the expression of Pστ (see equation(11)),after integrating
6with respect to θA, φA, ψA, the values of the integration of the terms that contain θB , φB, ψB is zero. So we get∫
A
f∗A (UA)Pστ (UA, UB) dUA
=
∫
A
f∗A (UA)POO (UA, UB) dUA
=
∫
A
f∗A (UA)PTT (UA, UB) dUA
=
∫
A
f∗A (UA)
1
4dUA =
1
4
(21)
Repeating the same procedure, we obtain that
∫
B
f∗B (UB)Pστ (UA, UB) dUB =
1
4
. According to the payoff functions
of $A (UA, UB) and $B (UA, UB) (see equation(12)), finally the payoff to both players is $¯A = $¯B =
α+β+2γ
4 . We list
four of the simplest solutions(Nash Equilibria) in the following table:
(1) f∗A = 1 f
∗
B = 1 $¯A = $¯B =
α+β+2γ
4
(2) f∗A = 1 f
∗
B =
2
pi|sin θB | $¯A = $¯B =
α+β+2γ
4
(3) f∗A =
2
pi|sin θA| f
∗
B = 1 $¯A = $¯B =
α+β+2γ
4
(4) f∗A =
2
pi|sin θA| f
∗
B =
2
pi|sin θB | $¯A = $¯B =
α+β+2γ
4
Any strategy in the table is a stable solution.
In the classical Battle of The Sexes Game, there are two Nash Equilibria: (O,O) and (T, T ). If the tactic mismatch
occurs, the strategic profile becomes (O, T ) or (T,O) and the payoffs turn out to be the worst-case payoff $¯A = $¯B = γ.
In the quantum version of this game, there are more than one Nash Equilibrium appearing when players adopted the
deterministic strategies (see in Ref[6]), and any tactic mismatch can lead to the worst-case payoffs. While when we
propose that if the players adopt quantum mixed strategies, it can be guaranteed that the possible appearance of the
tactic-mismatch will have no effect on the payoffs of the players, and the payoffs will always remain as α+β+2γ4 .
II. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the problems existing in the previous quantum Battle of The Sexes Game are studied in detail.
We proposed a new scheme, applying mixed quantum strategies, to quantize this game. In our scheme, the players
can choose their strategies in the all of SU (2). It means that there is no restriction on the quantum mechanically
possible manipulations of the players. We show that if the players resort to the mixed quantum strategy, in the
game the equilibria that they reach will be much more efficient than that in its classical version. Furthermore, the
tactic-mismatch which is the difficulty faced by the players in the traditional game[7] has no effect on the payoffs of
the players. Thus the dilemma which exists in the classical Battle of the Sexes Game is truly removed. The scheme
of mixed quantum strategy proves successful. We also hope that the scheme of mixed quantum strategy can be useful
for the investigation of other quantum games.
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